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Abstract Resilience is defined as the ability to adaptively
deal with system boundaries in the face of the unexpected
and unforeseen (Branlat and Woods in AAAI Fall Sym-
poisum, 2010. http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/FSS/
FSS10/paper/viewPaper/2238). We hypothesize that
drawing upon resilience-related knowledge is a prerequi-
site for such adaptivity. This paper proposes team reflection
(Ellis et al. in Curr Dir Psychol Sci 23(1):67–72, 2014) as a
macrocognitive function to make the resilience-related
knowledge explicit. This knowledge is implicitly available
with individual team members active at the sharp end but is
never explicitly shared due to invisibility of goal-relevant
constraints. To overcome this invisibility, we suggest an
application that makes changes in the current rail socio-
technical system visible in terms of the three system
boundaries, a variation of the originally proposed by Ras-
mussen (Saf Sci 27(2/3):183–213, 1997): safety, perfor-
mance and workload. This allows a team of rail signallers
to analyse movements towards system boundaries and
share knowledge on these movements. An observational
study at a rail control post was conducted to assess the
value of team reflection in making resilience-related
knowledge explicit. For this purpose, we developed a first
prototype of the application concerning the performance
boundary only. Using naturalistic observations of a team
during a week, we observed how they reflected at the end
of their shift on salient system changes. A global content
analysis was used to show the relevance of the content to
resilience and to test the increase in the resilience-related
knowledge throughout the observation period. A specific
case of a human approaching the rail tracks, as a potential
suicide, was analysed in detail. The results show the value
of team reflection on system movements towards their
boundaries, thus making goal-relevant constrained knowl-
edge explicit within the operational rail environment.
Keywords Team reflection  Resilience  Explicit
knowledge  Collaborative sensemaking  Rail control
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1 Introduction
Resilience engineering studies, among other aspects, the
ability of a socio-technical system (STS) to reorganize and
adapt to the unexpected and unforeseen (Hollnagel et al.
2006). Hollnagel (2009) theorizes that a resilient STS
needs four essential capabilities: responding, monitoring,
learning and anticipating. These capabilities differ in
moment and scope—actual, critical, factual and potential—
but have in common the need for explicit relevant knowl-
edge and the ability to apply this knowledge. This
knowledge is partly available at the sharp end of the sys-
tem, for instance with control operators, who are a com-
ponent of the STS interacting with the system environment.
However, this knowledge is frequently implicit due to the
fact that goal-relevant constraints, required to deal with
unforeseen disturbances, are not visible for operators, thus
hampering efficient knowledge-based behaviour (Burns
and Hajdukiewicz 2004; Rasmussen 1983, 1985; Vicente
and Rasmussen 1992). The question arises which method
should be used to make the available knowledge explicit.
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We have addressed this question in the context of a natu-
ralistic observation study conducted at a rail control post. A
rail STS is an example of a system that constantly needs to
adapt to disturbances, and rail signallers working at dif-
ferent control posts are responsible for making the rail
infrastructure available in a safe and timely manner, in the
face of daily disturbances.
We propose team reflection (Ellis et al. 2014; Reymen
2003; Schippers et al. 2007, 2014; West 2000; Wiedow and
Konradt 2010) as a mechanism for the team at the sharp
end to make the resilience-related knowledge explicit. The
resilience-related knowledge is defined as the knowledge
required to adapt to goal-relevant constraints (Ras-
mussen1985) imposed by the goals of the STS as they
occur due to unexpected and unforeseen events (Branlat
and Woods 2010). Team reflection includes behaviours
such as questioning, analysis, making use of knowledge
explicitly, reviewing past events with self-awareness and
coming to terms over time with a new awareness (West
2000). Team reflection, in a loop with planning and action,
is commonly used in a broader reflexive process (Schippers
et al. 2014; West 2000) where team members collectively
reflect upon the team’s objectives, strategies (e.g. decision-
making) and processes (e.g. communication). The results
of such a reflection can be fed back into the planning and
action/adaptation loop to improve team performance
(Schippers et al. 2014). However, in our case, the objec-
tives of reflection are to transform implicit to explicit
knowledge, at the sharp end, relevant to the resilience of a
socio-technical system as a whole rather than the team
itself as a focal point for reflection. This knowledge goes
beyond the direct responsibility of the team. Implicit
knowledge is tacit knowledge, a form of private knowledge
that is treated as ‘‘informal’’, and even, in a sense, ‘‘un-
conscious’’ knowledge (Day 2005; Polanyi1969), that can
be transformed to explicit knowledge (Frappaolo 2008).
We are interested in knowledge, relevant to system resi-
lience, acquired throughout the regular work of the rail
signallers. Resilience is about the behaviour of the socio-
technical system (STS) when it approaches and possibly
crosses its boundaries (Siegel and Schraagen 2014a;
Woods 2006b). The behaviour of an STS is an interrelated
process of all the different participants and technology
(Simon 1996; Waterson et al. 2015), which goes beyond
the direct responsibility and the team’s span of control at
the sharp end. However, the team at the sharp end is
exposed and aware outside its span of control and is able to
reveal knowledge related to resilience of the whole STS.
Therefore, reflection should be applied to system goals
rather than team goals.
Rail STSs have three main system boundaries: safety,
performance and workload (Siegel and Schraagen 2014c).
Since resilience of an STS manifests itself through its
ability to adapt and reorganize (Woods 2006b) around its
boundaries, it is the case here as well for the rail STS. The
movements of the operating system towards these bound-
aries during a shift of the control room operators, relative
to the movements in a previous period, may include hints
of system behaviour around the boundaries. As system
behaviour around the boundaries is the essence of resi-
lience, we expect that reflection on these movements will
cause resilience-related topics to arise. We assume that the
broad nature of system boundaries will cause discussion
beyond the scope of the team. For example, the team is
responsible for setting timely train paths, but through
communication, it has knowledge about the personnel on
the train, which is beyond its responsibility but can be
discussed. These system movements, relative to a previous
period, represent weak signals that could possibly signal a
‘‘drift into failure’’ (Dekker 2011). These changes can
function as cases to learn from, when the system succeeds
in dealing with the situation and things go right as opposed
to wrong (Hollnagel 2011). The challenge is to make weak
signals explicit and institute a process within the rail traffic
control organization to explicitly reflect upon these weak
signals to be able to learn from and therefore possibly
anticipate subsequent disturbances.
The proposed team-reflection process is applicable,
among others, to control rooms of STSs and in particular a
rail control post. Our research question in this context and
based upon the introduction above is: Does team reflection,
on STS movements towards its boundaries, make resi-
lience-related knowledge explicit? This research question
can be divided into three sub-questions: (1) What is
required, in terms of information presentation to operators,
to make knowledge explicit? (2) Is the knowledge that is
made explicit resilience-related? (3) Does ongoing practice
of team reflection increase the use of resilience-related
knowledge? We attempted to answer these questions by
conducting an empirical observational study at a rail con-
trol post following our proposed process of reflecting with
the whole team at the end of their shift. To facilitate team
reflection, we developed a prototype, named Resiliencer-
performance, which presents movements towards the per-
formance boundary and provides simple analysis functions
to retrieve the data behind the daily movements. In order to
motivate team reflection on topics related to resilience, we
captured movements of the operating system (OS) towards
and from the boundaries as described in our previous
research (De Regt et al. 2016; Siegel and Schraagen
2014a, c). In this paper, we focus only on the performance
boundary and particularly on punctuality. We assume that
one boundary is sufficient to study the proposed team-re-
flection process and trigger discussions that will make
resilience-related knowledge explicit. Resilience is a result
of interrelated forces and trade-offs caused by the three
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boundaries (Amalberti 2001; Cook and Rasmussen 2005;
Hoffman and Woods 2011). However, movements of the
operating state to only one boundary can already be seen as
a weak resilience signal (Siegel and Schraagen 2014c). We
have focused on the interaction with all three boundaries in
a separate publication (Siegel and Schraagen 2017), which
enlarges the discussion topics with interrelated cases. In the
next Sect. 2, we describe the methods used for the after-
shift team reflection, for the Resiliencer-performance
implementation and for the analysis. In Sect. 3, we
describe the observational study design, and in Sect. 4, we
present the results followed by a discussion in Sect. 5.
2 Method
We first describe the setting to understand the context of
the methods. The socio-technical system we have studied is
a Dutch rail post responsible for the area north and west of
Amsterdam with about fifty rail stations and a thousand
daily train trajectories (see Fig. 1). The work, performed
24/7, is assigned to rail signallers during the day across
four workstations and to one regional dispatcher, who is
out of scope of this study. The rail signallers must monitor
the system planning and execution. During disruptions,
they adjust the planning, manually direct the system and
follow safety procedures and protocols including commu-
nication with train drivers and other personnel. They enter
information about every train delay of more than 3 min
through a dedicated application, noting the cause of the
delay. This is the only place where they systematically
capture their knowledge about the system. The rail sig-
nallers perform their tasks, transfer the status to the next
signaller at the end of their shift and currently go home
without any organized discussion about their work. In case
of large disruptions, they may be approached for ques-
tioning by staff members or their managers, in most cases a
few days or more afterwards, but never immediately after
an incident or calamity occurred. The team reflection by
the rail signallers that we introduced at the end of their shift
is a new activity described in the next subsection. The
following subsection describes the requirements and pro-
totype of a tool to support this reflection process. The last
two subsections describe the reflection analysis method
used to identify the global content and the data-framing
method to analyse the expression of explicit knowledge.
2.1 Team reflection of rail signal operators
at the end of their shift
The team mentioned in this paper is a group of rail signal
operators working together during a shift at a rail control
post. We depict the effects of after-shift reflection on the
team’s knowledge in Fig. 2. The signal operators interact
individually with the rail STS while being part of it as well.
Throughout the interaction, they gain individual knowledge
Fig. 1 The rail map north of Amsterdam with stations mentioned in the text
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on the rail STS, which is partially made explicit through
data entry by the signallers themselves into the system.
Changes of the rail socio-technical system are expressed by
‘‘to/from boundary movements’’. Through the proposed
reflection process with analysis of the ‘‘to/from boundary
movements’’, they will exchange some of their knowledge
causing it to become explicit.
2.2 Tool for presentation and analysis of relative
movements towards the performance boundary
In the introduction, we have explained that operators lack
visibility of goal-relevant constraints. This visibility, to
stimulate and support discussion, can be obtained by the
reflecting team through a tool presenting a view with
analysis functions on its shift. The view should present
movements towards the system boundaries relative to a
previous period (De Regt et al. 2016; Siegel and Schraagen
2014c). In this research, we focus only on the performance
boundary as an example of the presentation and analysis
which are needed for all the system boundaries (i.e. safety
and workload), as described in a separate publication
(Siegel and Schraagen 2017). Performance in the rail sector
is a combination of punctuality and capacity. In the short
term, mainly punctuality plays a role since capacity is
nearly constant through its year planning and the effect of
disturbances on the capacity is presented through punctu-
ality as well. Punctuality of rail operations is well defined
as the difference between planned (i.e. according to the
latest published timetable) and actual moments of arrival or
departure from a specific station (Goverde 2005; Hansen
2010). However, in our case, we deal with many stations in
a large area, many trains, different routes and shift periods,
which need an extended punctuality definition. We have
taken all the delayed trains (equal or more than 3 min) of a
shift within the controlled area and calculated their average
delay increase between entering and leaving the area (see
detailed description in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
The presentation should be of a real-time nature to
capture data until the start of the reflection, and it should
have an ecological interface (Siegel and Schraagen 2017),
‘‘to reflect the constraints of the work environment in a way
that it is perceptually available to the people who use it’’
(Burns and Hajdukiewicz 2004, p. 1). The changes in
punctuality of an area with respect to a previous period are
a value well understood by the rail signaller, but it is dif-
ficult to translate a system punctuality number of an area to
a specific identifiable component. For that reason, the
application needs to provide a simple analysis function,
which helps to make the link between the high-level
punctuality change of the area to the identifiable compo-
nent. We used the adjective ‘‘simple’’ to emphasize that the
analysis function needs to fit an operator, as opposed to an
analyst. We built a prototype, referred to as Resiliencer-
performance, fulfilling these requirements (Fig. 3). The
application used real-time data and presented in live mode
the relative punctuality of the whole area. The area was
split into 4 main trajectories to have an initial clue which of
the trajectories contributes most to the overall result (left
side of Fig. 3). The trajectories were divided into passenger
and freight trains, since both have a different characteristic
concerning time delays. Passenger trains are tightly cou-
pled to the online published timetable, while freight devi-
ates frequently and has a lower punctuality priority. For the
analysis mode (right side of Fig. 3), we implemented a
search function to locate the contributing train with only 3
button pushes (see an example in the results Sect. 4.1
Fig. 7). On the right-hand side in the analysis mode, the
rail signallers can zoom into one of the trajectories. The top
window displays average train delays of train series.
Choosing one of the train series will result in the middle
display with all the specific trains. Choosing one specific
train will result in a delay diagram across its trajectory of
this train in the actual shift and the average delay of the
specific train in the reference period. The graphs expose the
specific train behaviour within the shift and expose patterns
or deviations of the same train in the reference period. This
information with its reasoning beyond the technical data
represents the constraints of the performance boundary in
terms identifiable by rail signallers. It is the basis for
Fig. 2 After-shift reflection of the operator team
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discussion on information beyond the hard technical fig-
ures, enabling the related knowledge to be made explicit.
2.3 Reflection global analysis
We recorded the team-reflection sessions and analysed
them. With this approach, we created a global overview of
the content throughout the reflection, which is dependent
on the events occurring during the shifts. We segmented
the discussion topics in the global overview to areas that
are essential to resilience behaviour, to illustrate that the
content is resilience-related. The aim of the global content
analysis is to show the relation of the discussion topics to
resilience. In the introduction, we explained our assump-
tion that reflection on system movements to and from
system boundaries, with their margins (Rankin et al. 2013),
will evoke resilience-related topics. This follows from the
definition of resilience as the ability to adapt and anticipate
to changes around system boundaries (Woods 2011). In the
following, we describe a coding scheme enabling us to
decide whether discussion topics are related to resilience or
not. The first category in the coding scheme is ‘‘adequately
dealing with procedures’’. Dekker (2003) claims that
organizations should invest in their understanding of the
gap between procedures and practice and help develop
operators’ skill at adapting. He sums up four reasons why
procedures do not work, although they are thought to
represent the best thought-out and thus the safest way to
carry out a job. The first reason is that there exists a mis-
match between procedures and practice. Second, the real
world has limited resources to follow the procedures.
Third, procedures cannot describe complex situations well.
Fourth, procedure following can be antithetical to safety.
Discussion about the flexibility of procedures (Bourrier and
Bieder 2013) in the real world will improve the perfor-
mance when applying, adjusting or even neglecting them in
real situations. For this reason, our first category of interest
to look for in the discussions is ‘‘adequately dealing with
procedures’’. The second category is ‘‘communication with
counterparties’’ (Baysari et al. 2008; Murphy 2001;
Shanahan et al. 2007). Baysari et al. (2009) reviewed 19
rail safety investigation reports in Australia and found,
among others, that the communication between driver and
signaller was the only recurring error to contribute to 12
analysed railway incidents. In the UK, research has iden-
tified types of communication errors involved in railway
incident occurrence (Murphy 2001; Shanahan et al. 2007).
These findings emphasize the importance to discuss com-
munication as contributing to resilient behaviour. More-
over, in discussions about communicative actions that need
to take place to deal with disturbances, the adaptive
capacity (Branlat and Woods 2010; Lundberg and
Johansson 2015) is reflected and cross-scale interactions
(Woods 2006a) are reflected in discussions about the
communication that took place across levels in the rail
system (e.g. between posts). The adaptive capacity is also
reflected in discussions about similar cases, which is the
third category—‘‘reference to similar cases’’. Discussing
similar cases in the same context shares understandings,
decisions made and reasoning, which can be adopted by
other team members in future situations (Haunschild and
Sullivan 2002; Hovden et al. 2011).
Fig. 3 The Resiliencer-performance in live mode (left) and analysis mode (right, enlarged for readability)
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We categorized each discussion topic as follows:
• Procedure mentioned
• Communication—this is split up to the main parties the




• ‘‘Knoco’’—name abbreviation of the station-node
coordinator
• Regional dispatcher or another rail signaller
• Another person
• Reference to similar cases
A combination of the three categories, when a train with
a deviation from the plan is discussed, indicates a relation
to resilience as discussed above.
2.4 Data-framing
We view team reflection on relative system movements as a
macrocognitive process of collaborative sensemaking (Fiore
et al. 2010; Malakis and Kontogiannis 2014) to explain how
knowledge is made explicit. The data-frame theory of
sensemaking (Klein et al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2016) postu-
lates that elements are explained when they are fitted into a
structure that links them to other elements. The term frame is
used to denote an explanatory structure that defines entities
by describing their relationship to other entities (Klein et al.
2007, p. 118). The initial trigger for the sensemaking process
in our domain of interest is information (data) on relative
operating state movements towards the boundary. Each of
the reflecting team members is exposed to these data and
frames it based upon his or her own implicit knowledge. In
Fig. 4, we have depicted the interaction between the indi-
vidual data-framing and the shared data-framing of a team
reflecting together. As seen in the data-frame diagram in the
left side of Fig. 4, the individual is questioning his data-
frame model by tracking anomalies, detecting inconsisten-
cies and judging plausibility. The questioning may cause the
need to reframe or to elaborate/preserve the data-frame.
When some equilibrium is achieved, one of the team
members may express himself explicitly and share his data-
frame with the team. In the social domain, the team will
verbally go through a similar process of discussing the
shared data-frame (the right side of Fig. 4) by questioning
and when needed by reframing or elaborating. During the
discussion, the knowledge is shared and becomes explicit
and thus available for all team members. The data-frame
cycle in the team domain will influence the individual
domain, through personal questioning and new frames to
compare with. This interaction between the team and indi-
vidual is continuous, until a satisfactory equilibrium is
found, through which related explicit knowledge is made
available. This generic process of an individual making his
implicit knowledge explicit through a social team process is
not new. However, we are trying to explain how resilience-
related knowledge is made explicit. We use the behaviour of
the system towards its boundaries as stimulator, being a
derivative of resilience by its definition (Woods 2006b), as
mentioned above. The relative system movements also
present drifts towards the boundary, which may not be
noticed on a daily basis, but may be amplified by presenta-
tion of work-shift data in comparison with previous longer
periods. Our research focuses on making drifts towards the
boundarymore notable for teammembers, such that they can
explicitly reflect upon this drift during team reflection and
collaborative sensemaking. This noticed drift is seen by
Dekker (2011) as a resilience component to act upon. The
data-frame theory depicts the process from relative system
movement data, through relevant framing, towards resi-
lience-related knowledge.
Within the data-frame theory of sensemaking (Klein et al.
2006), a process of questioning, elaboration or reframing is
described. In our method of data-framing, we are mimicking
this process to show how knowledge is made explicit. We
Fig. 4 Individual Data-Frame
interacting with shared Data-
Frame
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record the verbal expressions during the discussion and
transcribe them in line with verbal analysis (Chi 1997). This
timewe take a few sentences expressed on a topic and refer to
it as data, which needs a frame to fit in. The frame, a construct
to that of cognitive schema (DiMaggio 1977), is an organized
pattern of thought or behaviour that organizes categories of
information and the relationships among them. Since the
reflection starts with the Resiliencer-performance, the first
frame discussed is triggered from that domain. The main
frame triggered will be the Delay frame, triggering thought
and information on the occurrence of delays, but other
frames can be triggered as well, for example, a Graph-frame
concerning information of graphs, or a Reference-frame
about thoughts and experiences of the reference period. This
method is used to describe and cluster the knowledge made
explicit, where the mapping within a frame group is only a
means to structure the knowledge. In the results section, we
will present a casewhich on the one hand clarifies themethod
and on the other hand shows, with help of sequenced data-
framing, how knowledge is made explicit and how the
Resiliencer-performance has triggered the discussion,
through the initial frame.
3 Observational study design
The study design at the Dutch rail post described above
introduced team reflection with consent of the management
and the rail signallers at the rail control post (Fig. 6, in the top
centre). At the end of the rail signal operators’ duty (Fig. 6, in
the bottom centre), the team discussed delays within its
controlled area. For that, they used the Resiliencer-perfor-
mance (Fig. 6, left side). The application was configured for
the specific rail post under investigation. It presented in live
mode the punctuality status and provided in analysis mode
the ability to search for logistic details (i.e. the delay progress
of a specific train). The post-area was split up into four main
trajectories covering all stations, and each trajectory was
controlled by two out of the four workstations. This caused at
least two rail signallers to relate to the results of a main
trajectory. The results of the four trajectorieswere joined into
a result of the whole post during a shift.
The observational study took first place on one tryout day
with the new developed Resiliencer-performance prototype,
which was successful. A full working week followed from
Monday to Friday all with two shifts, except for Friday when
only themorning shift was taken into account. The early shift
lasted from 6:30 AM until 2:30 PM and the late shift from
2:30 PM until 10:30 PM. The reflections took place at 2 PM
for the early shift and at 9 PM for the late shift for about
30 min (see Fig. 5 for an impression).
The four rail signallers on duty voluntarily finished their
work between half an hour and an hour before their
scheduled ending time, during the observational study per-
iod, for a reflection session together with their team leader
(the next team voluntarily started earlier to fill in this gap).
They asked themselves the following generic questions:
• Did our shift today proceed better than the average of
last period? Why?
• What were the circumstances for the difference?
• Which of the identified circumstances could occur
again in the future?
• What can we learn from that?
• How can we deal with these circumstances and what
can we do differently?
For answering these questions, they used the Resi-
liencer-performance and analysed the numerical punctual-
ity progress in their area. However, reasoning beyond the
numerical data could only be accomplished with help of
their personal knowledge and notes made during their shift
(Fig. 6, in the centre). We recorded the discussion and
analysed it (Fig. 6, top right side) as described in the pre-
vious section. The protocol guiding the observations
included an oral recorder consent, due to cultural con-
straints and specific request of the post management, and
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of
Twente (No. BCE15199 dated 17-4-2015).
4 Results
4.1 Sequenced data-framing case: suicide attempt
(human approaches the rail)
We describe here a case, which we use to explain how
knowledge was made explicit, throughout a reflection
Fig. 5 Team reflection with the Resiliencer-performance
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session, with help of the data-framing model. The case is a
suicide attempt, which occurs almost daily within the
Netherlands. In 2011, 205 attempts and, in 2012, 188
attempts were successful (CBS—Statistics Netherlands
2015). This frequency causes adaptations in behaviour of
train drivers when dealing with human approaches to the
rail tracks. The standard procedure of a rail signaller in this
case is as follows. When a train driver reports the rail
signaller that he has seen a person approach the tracks, the
rail signaller alerts other train drivers on the trajectory to
slow down and watch for that person. Only when a second
time the person has been spotted, the rail signaller will call
the police. The train drivers are expected not to stop unless
the person is on the tracks and should let the police
approach the person in question. However, reality does not
follow these stated procedures. During our observation
period, the situation of a person approaching the rail
occurred twice, without deadly ending. The first time train
drivers stopped near the person until the police came. The
second time the train driver decided on his own to take the
person into his cabin up to the end station where he
delivered the person to the police. These cases arose during
the reflections. We have used the data-framing theory to
show the process by which information is made explicit
and how it is related to the initial trigger of the Resiliencer-
performance. In the left side of Fig. 7, we marked on the
Resiliencer-performance in analyse mode the steps fol-
lowed. The signallers identified that the maximum delay on
the trajectory Den-Helder–Zaandam was 13 min (marking
1a) and searched to find the train with that delay on the
trajectory (marking 1b). Marking 2 is the identification of
the 3000 series, and marking 3 is the identification of the
specific 3023 train. The delay trajectory is shown in the
results window (marked R) and enlarged at the right side of
Fig. 7.
In Table 1, we have detailed the verbalization of the
reflection, the related frame, the frame group it belongs to
and the explicit knowledge within the team-reflection
domain. The first step is associated with the Resiliencer
frame group, making sense of what is presented on the
screen. The next step is the identification of the actor, and
further framing is used to get to the relevant details of the
case discussed. Table 1 includes abbreviations of the
following persons: team leader (TL) and rail signaller
(RS).
To explain how knowledge was being made explicit,
team reflection can be seen as a frame sequence process,
after which each frame has been elaborated or reframed.
The first frame is from the Resiliencer frame group con-
cerning the relative system movement—the performance of
the shift relative to a previous period, the performance of
the main trajectories and extreme performance. Reframing
causes focus on the actors, train 3023 with its train driver,
and is followed by focus on the case and details within. The
following frame sequence occurred in our case:
• Delay frame was triggered by the Resiliencers relative
system movement
• an extreme delay (13 min) on trajectory Den-
Helder–Zaandam
• Train frame, as an actor, was triggered by the Delay
frame
• Series 3000 with train 3023
Fig. 6 Illustration of study design
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• Train 3023—Driving from Den-Helder to Amster-
dam Sloterdijk. 0 min delay at Alkmaar (06:42) and
11 min delay at Heiloo (06:46 ? 00:11).
• Suicide frame was the case frame triggered by the
Delay and Train frames
• Reporting of a person approaching the rail
• Procedure (formal versus reality) frame was a detail
frame triggered by the suicide frame
• Reporting of and to the train drivers
• The stop of the train driver not according to the
procedure
• Point of interest
• The train driver. His behaviour when locating
the person near the rail.
• Higher abstraction
• Train drivers and suicides
Through the sequence of data-framing, rail signallers
revealed to each other their work ‘‘as done’’ (Cowley and
Borys 2014, p. 21; Lundberg et al. 2009, p. 1298) as
opposed to the work ‘‘as designed’’ or ‘‘as described’’ in the
procedures they need to follow. In our case, they learned
from each other how train drivers behave in reality when a
person is approaching the rail, being triggered by infor-
mation of the Resiliencer-performance. The standard pro-
cedure of ordering the train driver to continue his journey,
to wait for a second spotting and then to call the police, did
not work. Understanding the real world, as it unfolds,
includes knowledge, which may be important in next
occurrences of similar cases and can also help in new
cases. When the unforeseen and unexpected occur, it may
be crucial to use knowledge and experience on accepted
deviations from standard procedures.
4.1.1 Drift towards the boundary and the interdependent
relationship
Another aspect seen in this case is the slow drift towards
the boundary. The average delay of delayed trains during
this shift was 1.8 min, while the delay in the previous
month was 1.3 min. This means that the movement
towards the performance boundary was only 30 s, where
only trains with 3 min or more are counted officially. If the
prototype would not have presented data for discussion on
this seemingly small movement, then in-depth discussion,
making related knowledge explicit, may not have taken
place on this suicide case. Moreover, when searching for
Fig. 7 The suicide case (Resiliencer-performance in analyse mode)
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the reason of this small daily drift, it appeared that the same
train (no 3023) had 6 delay occurrences in the last month
(see the brown reference line in Fig. 8). All delays started
between Alkmaar and Heiloo, indicating that this area
causes more delays due to suicidal behaviour. Curiously,
this particular fact has been discussed in the second
chamber of the Dutch parliament as well (Minister van
Verkeer and Waterstaat 2010), an example of the interre-
latedness of different areas influencing the events and
behaviour of the rail STS. These facts can be used for
learning and anticipating. But beyond these interesting
understandings, it becomes clear that the relationships of
all entities are very interdependent (Woods and Branlat
2010). It is not a matter of a direct link between a signal
and its cause. The signal hides many interrelated entities,
which can be revealed through the knowledge exposed by
the sharp end. Like in our case, the following short and
incomplete list was revealed: train-delay, suicide,
Table 1 Data framing making available explicit knowledge
Date Person Verbalization (data) Frame Frame
group
Explicit knowledge
9 E TL Look at the results of today. Delays on
the main trajectory Den-Helder–
Zaandam had an average delay of 50%
more than the average in the last
month (1.9 min delay vs. 1.3 min).






Resiliencer Today the punctuality was 50% lower
than punctuality last month
The maximum delay today on trajectory
Den-Helder–Zaandam is 13 min
9E TL Let’s search for the extreme delay. Oh,
it is train 3023
Train with extreme delay Actor Between Alkmaar and Heiloo the 3023
stopped
9E TL Look at the graph plotting. The delay
development along the trajectory
relative to the average of all delayed
3023’s of last month
Delay development on the
trajectory Den-Helder–
Zaandam
Case The delay was extreme relative to other
delayed 3023’s last month
9E RS-2 Yes, that is the 3023 I had contact with.
When leaving Alkmaar it received an
assignation ‘‘drive carefully’’, since
we received from a previous train,
driving the opposite direction, a
mention that a person was walking
near the rail. The train left the station
but instead of driving slowly it has
stopped near the person in question. In
addition the next train from the other
direction has stopped near the person
as well! And after the 3023 another
trained stepped, since the rail section
was occupied. All causing stopping
and delays of a few trains, which in
turn caused rail-crossings to close, not
reopen and failing the system
Behaviour of train drivers
when people approach rail
Details Train drivers should not stop when
seeing a person near the rail
They should drive slowly while the rail
controller calls the police
Train drivers do not strictly obey and
stop near the person
Train drivers cooperate and may stop to
help each other
29 E TL The average delay was today a bit less
than the average last month. However,
between Amsterdam-Sloterdijk and





Resiliencer Maximum system movement is also
interesting even when the average is a
bit lower than last month
29 E TL Let’s search for the train. Here it is. It is
train 5447. Who knows what has
happened?
Train with extreme delay Actor Between Amsterdam-Sloterdijk and
Zandvoort the 3023 stopped
29 E RS-3 Yes, I have had contact with that train. I
gave him an assignation leaving
Haarlem to ‘‘drive carefully’’ since an
old man has been seen near the rails.
The train driver stopped near the man
and taken him into his cabin. He has
delivered the man to the police on
arrival. Ha, ha, he did not pay a ticket
Behaviour of train drivers
when people approach rail
Case
details
Train drivers do not only disobey by
stopping near a person. They even take
a person near the rail into their cabin
although it is strictly forbidden to for
any (!) person to enter the cabin
Train drivers take personal risks
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deviation from procedures, second chamber, many occur-
rences between Alkmaar and Heiloo, etc. The reflection on
this weak signal, a delay drift, caused discussion and
awareness of complex interrelationships and enhanced the
explicit knowledge as an important resilience behaviour
component (Dekker 2011).
The description above is a typical example of a weak
resilience signal (WRS) triggering discussion beyond the
movement towards the boundary. It supports our assump-
tion that even a WRS on one boundary can reveal knowl-
edge with a variety of dimensions and interrelationships.
This case with only 30 s drift got attention because on that
day, train 3023 had the largest delay, which was the reason
for the team to choose that train in the sequence of
Sect. 4.1. The team could choose any deviation, which
draw their attentions. The triggers, weak resilience signals,
make knowledge explicit which include resilience-related
components, analysed for the observation week in the next
Sect. 4.2.
4.2 Global analysis
The global results of the reflections are presented in
Table 2. The first column contains the date, the day of the
month (April 2015, last day was on the first of May) and
the shift (E = early and L = late). The second column
contains the number of trains discussed throughout the
reflection. Some trains were discussed, without having any
issue, having a role in the logistic stories of the rail sig-
nallers. The next column contains the number of train cases
having an issue. The column after that contains the number
of procedures discussed. In hindsight, it became apparent
that any train having an issue was reasoned about with the
help of at least one procedure to explain the actions. These
procedures were central in the team’s reflection, and sig-
nallers discussed whether they were or should be obeyed as
well as the need to adjust them. Some procedures con-
cerned logistics decisions, while others consisted of
sequences to act. An example of a logistics decision is the
priority of an express-train over a stop-train. An express-
train has priority over a stop-train until it is delayed more
than ‘‘x’’ minutes, minimizing extra delays within the
system. An example of a sequence to act procedure is the
moment to call the police when the train driver has spotted
a person near the rail tracks. The standard procedure is to
call all train drivers on the trajectory to spot the person for
a second time to make sure the police will not come
unnecessarily. However, this second spotting may cause a
delay being too late to prevent an accident. The next col-
umn contains the number of communicators the rail sig-
naller has contact with, as mentioned in the reflection. The
first sub-column lists the total of train driver, police, col-
league who may be another signaller or a regional dis-
patcher, or any other person. In most cases, the train driver
is contacted, while the others are strongly dependent on the
situation. The last column contains the number of reference
cases cited during the reflection. Most cases where proce-
dures were mentioned were tied to another reference case.
The test week was very quiet, yet cases occurred and
were discussed. On average, 7.2 trains were discussed
during each shift. On average, 3.1 trains out of the 7.2 were
considered to have an issue.
From the information in Table 2, we can test whether
there was an increase in the use of resilience-related
knowledge categories throughout the observation week.
Assuming that the number of procedures and communi-
cators discussed is an indicator of the quantity, we can
divide it by the number of delayed trains to test an increase
per delayed train. The results are plotted in Fig. 8, showing
a shallow increasing trend line for both ratios during the
week. Days 29L and 30L were not plotted since no devi-
ated trains occurred on that day. Days 9E and 9L were test
days of the Resiliencer-performance with full compliance
of the reflection protocol, justifying to add the data to the
observation week. Those days were actually the first time
the reflection was performed in operations. The increase
during the observation was not substantial, although a jump
on the procedure rate occurred on day 28L. This result
Fig. 8 Change of procedure
and communication ratio with
respect to number of deviancy
trains
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indicates a possible increase in the resilience-related
knowledge categories discussed over the course of the
observation week. A longer period of observation is needed
to strengthen our hypothesis that this type of knowledge
increases when team reflection is facilitated by presenting
goal-relevant constraints.
5 Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to test the proposition that
team reflection on system movements towards it bound-
aries will make resilience-related knowledge explicit. The
high-level requirements of a tool used by the operators
during their team reflection are: (1) the interface should be
ecologically designed (Burns and Hajdukiewicz 2004)
combining all boundaries; (2) the data must be of a real-
time nature; (3) the interface includes simple analysis
functions to relate system boundary values to specific
identifiable components. These requirements give an
answer on the first question posed in the introduction on the
needs of the operators to make knowledge explicit. The
tool was prototyped and used during our observation at a
rail control post. Through the analysis of their discussions
during a specific case, we showed how knowledge was
made explicit, using the data-frame theory of sensemaking
(Klein et al. 2006). In this case, we were able to show as
well the interrelationships between entities during a drift
towards the boundary. With help of a global analysis, we
showed that the explicit knowledge is related to resilience
and that its use indicates a possible increase throughout the
observation. These findings give an answer on the second
and third question in the introduction on the relation to
resilience and the increase in knowledge.
However, proving that a specific knowledge detail will
play a role in resilient behaviour when the unexpected or
unforeseen occurs is extremely difficult. Other researchers
(Heese et al. 2014; Herrera et al. 2015; Van der Beek and
Schraagen 2015; Woods et al. 2014) have looked at other
properties than knowledge to assess the resilience of an
STS. They strongly based their research on two funda-
mental theories: the four cornerstones of Hollnagel (2009)
and the stress–strain theory of Woods andWreathall (2008).
Schraagen (2015) has introduced the relation between net-
works, knowledge and resilience. We have made a first
attempt to show the relation between knowledge and resi-
lience in an empirical setting through reflection (Ellis et al.
2014) and the data-frame theory of sensemaking (Klein
et al. 2007). We showed the relation indirectly by splitting
the analysis of the reflection discussion into two—global
and specific. In the global analysis, we showed the relation
of the topics to resilience through three categories derived
from previous research—‘‘adequately dealing with proce-
dures’’, ‘‘communication with counterparties’’ and ‘‘refer-
ence to similar cases’’. In the specific analysis, we showed,
with help of sequenced data-framing, how knowledge was
made explicit in those resilience-related topics. In addition,
we demonstrated the relation of the frames to the Resi-
liencer-performance, a support tool that presents relative
system movements towards the performance boundary,
where resilience behaviour is needed. The results support
the assumption that knowledge is related to resilience, but a
further quasi-experiment would definitely strengthen our
argument. In addition, we tested the increase in the use of
resilience-related knowledge throughout the observation
week. To this end, we controlled for the number of delayed
trains, as any delayed train would surely lead to more
knowledge being made explicit. By the end of the week, an
increase was observed in resilience-related knowledge
being discussed, even when controlling for the number of
delayed trains, indicating that the introduction of team
reflection was successful. Of course, this result needs to be









Num. of communicators discussed Num. of ref.
cases discussed
Ttl T-driver Police Colleague Other
9 E 7 4 4 5 4 1 0 0 4
9 L 13 3 3 3 1 0 2 0 3
27 E 8 8 11 11 6 3 0 2 8
27 L 9 7 7 11 7 0 1 3 7
28 E 8 3 3 5 3 1 1 0 3
28 L 5 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1
29 E 8 3 4 3 2 0 1 0 3
29 L 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 E 4 3 4 3 3 0 0 0 3
30 L 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 E 9 2 2 4 2 1 0 1 2
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interpreted with caution as we did not observe over a longer
period of time and cannot state whether this effect would
hold up.
The observation was done in real operations without a
control group. We did not organize reflection sessions
without the Resiliencer-performance, since in real opera-
tions, the cases vary largely from day to day and would be
difficult to compare. However, rail signallers stated that, in
the past, previous debriefing attempts had been less suc-
cessful than their current team reflection sessions, because:
• The discussions were not interesting and focused
mainly on major events during the shift, which all of
them were already aware of;
• No online system exists today, which gives a good
picture of the shift. The operational systems are real
time and are not designed for debriefing.
The reflection tool we introduced addressed the short-
comings of previous debriefing attempts by being an online
tool dedicated to the after-shift team reflection as it pre-
sents the information from a different perspectives than the
major events during the shift. Although the field observa-
tions took place during a quiet period, the tool was able to
trigger topics rail signallers were not directly aware of. An
example is the identification of delay trends compared to
previous periods. Moreover, the tool caused discussion on
things that go right and is therefore in line with resilience
thinking (Hollnagel 2011). Rail signallers became explic-
itly aware of procedures not being followed and shared this
knowledge. We assume that through this awareness,
learning took place and that in subsequent scenarios,
anticipation and responding might be improved. As these
activities are thought to underlie resilience performance
(Hollnagel 2009), we may assume resilience of the team as
a whole improved. However, due to limited observation
possibilities, we were in the current study unable to look at
the team’s behaviour in the long run. Therefore, any con-
clusions on the causal relation between knowledge and
resilience are premature at this stage.
We have shown in this paper how the resilience engi-
neering approach of sensemaking on post-event recon-
struction adds value beyond the simple traditional system
monitoring. However, the approach contains an inherent
complexity. The success of the reflection making resilience
relevant knowledge explicit depends on the individuals,
group dynamics and culture of the environment (Gabelica
et al. 2014; Schippers et al. 2014). Moreover, it also depends
on the information provided to the team to reflect on. It is in
the end the group’s responsibility to identify the right event
and reveal the relevant information to each other. More
research is needed to understand ways to overcome these
limitations and provide methodologies that result in a con-
sistent set of information under similar conditions.
The team reflection in the experiment focused only on
the performance boundary, while in theory (Siegel and
Schraagen 2014b), there are two more boundaries: the
safety boundary and the workload boundary. The concept
of gaining knowledge of all the complex interdependencies
beyond this boundary was discussed above in the context
of the suicide case study. A more complete picture may
arise through the usage of the three boundaries. An
experiment with all three boundaries (Siegel and Schraagen
2017) will give more empirical insight on the contribution
of team reflection in a broader sense and will deepen the
understanding of collaborative sensemaking on related
subjects from different boundaries of a system.
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Appendix: Punctuality definition of an area
An extended punctuality definition is needed to deal with
many stations in a large area, many trains, different routes
and shift periods. This definition is the basis for the pre-
sentation and analysis during reflection (see variable defi-
nitions used in Table 3). The context is a control area A and
m stations Sj; j ¼ 1; . . .;m. In this area are nA trains,
Ti; i ¼ 1; . . .; nA, driving during shift period between tstartshift




A Control area with m rail stations and nA trains
Sj; j ¼ 1; . . .;m Rail station within control area A
Ti; i ¼ 1; . . .; nA Train within control area A




Planned arrival moment of train Ti at station Sj
DAPi Increased punctuality of train Ti in area A
DAPgroup Average increased punctuality of group trains in
area A
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and tendshift. Train Ti has at station Sj a punctuality of Pi;j ¼
t
act;dep=arr
i;j  tplan;dep=arri;j being positive when the train is
delayed, where t
act;dep=arr
i;j is the actual moment of arrival
(arr) or departure (dep) of train Ti at station Sj and
t
plan;dep=arr
i;j is the planned moment. The train Ti has a route
starting at station SBj and ending at station SEj where
SBj; SEj 2 fSj; j ¼ 1; . . .;mg 2 A. The punctuality of train
Ti at the start of its route in area A (station SBj) is: Pi;Bj ¼
t
act;dep
i;Bj  tplan;depi;Bj and at the end of his route (station SEj)
Pi;Ej ¼ tact;arri;Ej  tplan;arri;Ej . A train, in this context, is defined
as delayed when ðPi;Bj or Pi;EjÞ td, where td is a time
duration set by the rail sector. In our case td = 3 min. This
definition causes delays of train Ti within its trajectory at
area A not be counted as a delay.
Team reflection needs an indication on the performance
of the trains within area A. We have chosen to calculate the
punctuality increase in delayed trains during the shift. We
present its relation to the same parameter during a refer-
ence period, which is the last week, month or year. The
increased punctuality of train Ti in area A is
DAPi ¼ Pi;Ej  Pi;Bj. The average increased punctuality of
delayed trains Ti in area A during shift period between t
start
shift
and tendshift is DAPshift ¼ 1n
Pn
i¼1 DAPi;shift where n is the
number of delayed trains driving in area A within the shift
interval tstartshift  tact;depi;Bj or tact;arri;Ej  tendshiftcausing trains, cross-
ing the shift boundary, counted in both shifts. The average
increased punctuality of delayed trains in area A during a
reference period of shifts is DAPref . Movements towards
the performance boundary are identified through the rela-
tion between DAPshift and DAPref . When the first is larger
than we talk about, a movement occurs towards the
boundary; otherwise, the movement is away from the
boundary. We have implemented the above in an applica-
tion called the Resiliencer-performance (Fig. 3).
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